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‘Diaspora at Home’: Class and Politics in the Navigation of Hong Kong Students in 
Mainland China’s Universities 
Abstract 
This paper draws on ‘diaspora at home’, a concept that encapsulates the unique dynamics 
between Hong Kong and mainland China, as an analytical tool to explore the cross-border 
experiences of 23 Hong Kong students at 11 universities in mainland China. It empirically 
ascertains how the made and imposed claims and identifications of these Hong Kong students 
resulted in inclusion and exclusion as their interactions with their mainland peers and 
institutions deepened. Specifically, it highlights how their ‘diaspora at home’ status offered 
exclusive access to privileged higher education opportunities, preferential treatments and 
opportunities for upward social mobility. Meanwhile, such a status also resulted in an 
overwhelming sense of political liability as they unwittingly became ‘political tokens’ and 
suspected political subjects amid the increasingly tense political atmosphere between mainland 
China and Hong Kong. This paper pinpoints the relevance of class and politics in understanding 
how diasporic groups engage with higher education. 
Keywords: diaspora at home, China, Hong Kong, class, politics, higher education 
 
Introduction 
Within-country cross-border student mobility 
In cross-border student mobility literature, a nascent body of research has begun to focus on 
movements within the boundaries of a single country, extending beyond the existing 
predominant focus on movements across nation states (Robertson, 2013; Waters, 2007). Tindal 
and colleagues (2015), for example, investigate how the contrasting higher education systems 
between Scotland and England, two nations within the United Kingdom, had motivated bi-
directional cross-border movements among (mostly middle-class) students in a quest for social 
and cultural distinction. Such distinction is found to be achieved through access to the 
institutional prestige, subject reputation and cosmopolitan socio-geographic location of the 
chosen higher education institutions (HEIs). Similarly, in the case of mainland China and Hong 
Kong, research has shown that middle-class and academically high-achieving students from 
mainland China are attracted to Hong Kong’s higher education because of its global outlook 
and high standing in international league tables (Xu, 2015a, 2015b). It is clear from this 
literature that middle-class families are prepared to reap distinction through cross-border 
education by investing substantial economic resources.  
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However, it is less clear what experiences students from working-class backgrounds might 
have in navigating such within-country higher education mobility. When resources are limited, 
what ‘prices’ do working-class students have to pay in order to achieve cross-border or even 
upward social mobility? To address this question, this paper evokes the experiences of Hong 
Kong students (mostly working-class) in mainland China’s universities as a case in point. This 
case is situated within Hong Kong’s class inequalities in access to higher education and the 
complex political nature of the Hong Kong-mainland China relations.  
 
‘Failures’ or victims of education inequalities in Hong Kong? 
Hong Kong has one of the world’s highest Gini coefficient. In 2018, the city’s wealth gap 
reached the largest in 45 years (Wong, 2018). Such a wide wealth gap has translated into stark 
education inequalities, especially in differentiated higher education access. Research shows 
that in 2013 ‘university degree enrolment rate of young people (aged 19 and 20) living in the 
top 10% richest families (48.2%) [was] 3.7 times that of those living in poverty (13%)’ 
(O'Sullivan & Tsang, 2015, p. 460). Since only 18% of Hong Kong’s local high-school 
graduates are offered degree-level government-funded places at public universities (ibid., p. 
457), students from lower socio-economic backgrounds (i.e. working-class) are much more 
likely to be shunned from entering local HEIs. Admittedly, these working-class students could 
choose self-funded sub-degree or top-up degree programmes. However, research reveals that 
such programmes engender alienation and stigma, rendering these students as ‘failures’ and 
second-class graduates who are slighted by employers and government officials (Leung & 
Waters, 2013). This unequal higher education environment ‘perpetuate[s] class distinctions’ 
(O'Sullivan & Tsang, 2015, p. 460) and impels working-class students to become creative in 
crafting their educational paths, e.g. enrolment in mainland universities.  
Compared with popular cross-border study destinations such as the US and the UK, mainland 
China may be regarded as less attractive due to the lower-ranking of most of its universities in 
international league tables (Te and Postiglione, 2018). However, over the past decade, the 
number of Hong Kong students applying to study in mainland universities saw a tenfold surge. 
Between 2011 and 2016, a total of nearly 15,500 Hong Kong students applied. In 2017/18, 
more than 4,300 Hong Kong students were recruited to around 90 universities in mainland 
China (Te & Postiglione, 2018). For the working-class students who are unable to get into 
Hong Kong’s local HEIs, universities in mainland China become appealing due to preferential 
admission policies and treatments. These include lowering of admission scores and provision 
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of incentives such as low tuition fees, scholarships and better accommodation. Such 
preferential policies could be considered as politically motivated, underpinned by the 
disquieting Hong Kong-mainland China relations.  
 
Integration amid escalating tensions 
In 1997, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. As stipulated by its 
Basic Law, Hong Kong maintains its capitalist (instead of socialist) economy, freedom of 
speech and rule of law, governed under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle for a 50-
year period (i.e. up to 2047). However, the Hong Kong-mainland China relations have been 
fraught with escalating tensions of identitarian politics. Recent examples of conflicts include 
the ongoing protests triggered by the proposal of a controversial extradition bill that would 
allow Hong Kong to extradite criminal suspects to mainland China (Yuan, 2019) and the 79-
day long Umbrella Movement in 2014, a student-led instance of civil disobedience that 
demanded greater democracy in electing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive (Chan, 2015). These 
high-profile political movements in Hong Kong arguably epitomise the underlying tensions 
across the border.  
On the one hand, Hong Kong’s closer economic ties with mainland China have been 
accompanied by notable influx of Chinese visitors whose behaviour is often found to be at odds 
with Hong Kong’s own. This triggers a ‘surge of right-wing nativism’ that is hostile towards 
‘China’ while feeling threatened and fearing getting marginalised amid China’s rise as the 
world’s major economic power (Ip, 2015, p. 410). This situation has inevitably ‘politicised the 
Hong Kong-China relationship in all aspects of everyday life’ (ibid.), as enacted through 
mistreatments of mainland tourists and discriminations against mainland students in its 
universities (Xu, 2015b, 2017, 2018a, 2018b).  
On the other hand, from the perspective of people in mainland China, this series of political 
movements has positioned Hong Kong as ‘a source of instability’ and the Hongkongers as 
‘ungrateful separatists and troublemakers’ (Yuan, 2019, para 24). This unique context thus 
renders politics an important factor to consider when investigating Hong Kong students’ 
experiences in mainland China’s universities, in addition to the issue of class.  
Therefore, this paper seeks to address this research question: what roles do class positions and 
political stances of Hong Kong students play their experience of mainland universities? To this 




‘Diaspora at home’ 
Diaspora is a conceptual tool with a long history. Initially deployed to portray catastrophic 
dispersal of victimised groups from an original homeland, the notion has subsequently 
expanded to encompass labour, trade, and cultural groups (Brubaker, 2005). Among these, the 
overseas Chinese diaspora has attracted considerable scholarly attention (Ong, 1999). Before 
Hong Kong’s sovereign return to the PRC, the people of Hong Kong were categorised as part 
of this overseas Chinese diaspora. At that time, some students from Hong Kong joined other 
groups from Malaysia, Indonesia and Burma to pursue higher education in Taiwan, which acted 
as a ‘surrogate homeland’ for the Chinese diaspora (Lan & Wu, 2016, p. 744).  
When Hong Kong returned to the PRC, overnight, the people of Hong Kong no longer 
belonged to the overseas Chinese diaspora. However, the legacy of colonial rule and Hong 
Kong’s special status continue to mark Hongkongers’ distinction from their counterparts in 
mainland China (Chan, 2015; Xu, 2015b). This is a typical example in which the border 
migrated over people (Brubaker, 2005, p. 3). Consequently, borrowing from Charusheela 
(2007, p. 295), Hongkongers ‘were suddenly narrated into the experiential status that diaspora 
marks when coded as the stranger[s]-within. They may not have crossed the border. The border 
crossed them.’ (original emphasis) Extending ‘diaspora’ to ‘diaspora at home’, in this case, 
seems fitting to capture the complex and multiple Chinese identities of the Hong Kong students 
who journey across the within-country border.  
‘Diaspora at home’ has been a productive analytical tool. In his research on Tamil migrant 
experiences in Bombay in 1970s India, Charusheela (2007, p. 296) argues,  
 
the types of exclusions and navigations the term [diaspora] highlights, the recompositions 
and fusions of identities it brings to our attention, can be found within a nation as groups 
move across it and transverse varied internal boundaries of regional and lingual identity. 
(original emphasis) 
 
Charusheela emphasises that the religious minorities in India (e.g. Muslim Tamils) experienced 
‘intense forms of similar efforts and tensions around cultural identity’ to ‘the type marked by 
the concept of diaspora’ (ibid.) even though they may have only moved within India (i.e. from 
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Tamil to Bombay), instead of moving trans-nationally, as the notion of ‘diaspora’ is most often 
understood (Brubaker, 2005).  
‘Diaspora at home’ has also been applied to examine the experiences of Taiwanese migrants 
in mainland China. Lin (2011) investigates 16 Taiwanese who migrated to mainland China due 
to risk of unemployment at home. These Taiwanese migrants’ identification with mainland 
China as their ‘ethnic homeland’ (Lin, 2011, p. 52) seemed pertinent, constituting a typical 
‘diasporic stance’ (Brubaker, 2005, p. 13). Migrating to mainland China thus constituted a 
‘diaspora at home’ experience, with them initially expecting effortless integration. However, 
‘they quickly realised that their Chinese knowledge was not only spatially disoriented but also 
temporally disembedded from the real China’ (ibid.). There were considerable discrepancies 
between these Taiwanese migrants’ ‘imagined Chinese knowledge that they had obtained in 
Taiwan and the real Chinese experience encountered in China’. The Taiwanese migrants 
gradually rediscovered their ‘Chinese’ identification and repositioned themselves as ‘not so 
Chinese’ or ‘not the Chinese Chinese’ (ibid., p. 53). Employing ‘diaspora at home’ thus 
allowed the researcher to piece together the pre-migration imagination of the ‘ethnic homeland’ 
and the subsequent, often unintended, exclusions and frictions in mutual communication and 
integration efforts of the Taiwanese migrants and their mainland Chinese ‘compatriots’.  
When applied to the case of Hong Kong students in mainland universities, the issues of class 
and politics, as demonstrated above, play an important role. This focus is in congruence with 
migration scholars’ call to avoid homogenising diaspora groups (Anthias, 1998; Kleist, 2008). 
Indeed, although Lin (2011) has acknowledged the economic motivations among the 
Taiwanese migrants, the potential impact of class on their diasporic experiences has not been 
fully explored. In Lan and Wu’s (2016) research on Taiwanese students’ experiences in 
mainland universities, they highlighted how these students were made more aware of the 
contrasting political values between themselves and their mainland counterparts, leading some 
of them to cherish the democratic progress made in Taiwan more.  
Building on this literature, this article will explore the ways in which claims made by and about 
the Hong Kong students, members of a ‘diaspora at home’, ‘might have political resonance and 
can be used as part of a political mobilisation’ (Kleist 2008, p. 1138) amid the broader 
structures between mainland China and Hong Kong. Adopting ‘diaspora at home’ as an 
analytical lens, this article will consider how class and politics intersect to shape the 
experiences of these Hong Kong students in mainland universities.  
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In so doing, this article makes three main contributions to literature. Firstly, it examines an 
understudied phenomenon, the case of within-country student migration and adopts the lens of 
‘diaspora at home’ to tease out the inherently political nature of such cross-border student 
migration. Secondly, it emphasises the crucial and embedded impacts of class in orienting these 
Hong Kong students to embrace the PRC’s politically-motivated preferential higher education 
admission policies and to achieve upward social mobility. Lastly, by explicating the complex 
and nuanced political prices that these Hong Kong students had to pay in exchange for their 
upward social mobility, this paper joins a growing body of literature to expose the inherent 
inequalities and problematic nature of cross-border student mobility. Next, I will detail the 
research methods and participant profiles.  
 
Methods 
Data are drawn from in-depth interviews conducted between September 2016 and May 2017 
with 23 Hong Kong students and graduates who were pursuing or had pursued undergraduate 
studies in 11 universities in mainland China, all except one in Beijing. There were 8 male and 
15 female participants, aged between 19 and 27. The participants studied a wide range of 
subjects, such as Chemistry, Law, modern languages, History, Chinese medicine and 
Economics. As indicated in Table 1, only one participant (Stuart) managed to obtain an offer 
from a top-ranked university in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong University of Science and 
Technology, but he chose Peking University (PKU) instead. Five other participants got degree 
offers from less prestigious universities in Hong Kong and opted for more prestigious mainland 
counterparts. 
Since tuition fees and maintenance expenditure are only around HK$6,000 (£586) per year, all 
participants indicated that this low cost was a major factor in choosing mainland universities. 
Regarding parents’ occupations, about half were from typical working-class backgrounds, with 
both or either parents making no income (i.e. unemployed, retired, or having passed away) or 
occupying low-income jobs such as security guards and cleaners. In terms of household income, 
while some chose not to disclose details, at least half reported low levels of income, e.g. under 
HKD 20,000 (around £1,953) per month, in comparison with HKD40,000 (around £3,906), the 
median income level of Hong Kong households consisting of four members in 2017 (Hong 
Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2018).  
 




Participants were recruited through the snowball sampling technique, with the researcher 
approaching colleagues working in mainland universities for recommendation. Participants 
recruited in the initial round then referred further contacts for participation. This sampling 
technique could be critiqued for a lack of coherence in recruiting participants (Noy, 2008), thus 
leading to an unrepresentative sample. For instance, there is an over-representation of certain 
HEIs such as the Chinese University of Political Science and Law (4/23) and Beijing Normal 
University (6/23). This means that my analysis had to be mindful of contrasting institutional 
practices and consequent lived experiences of certain students. Despite this, as this is a small-
scale study that makes no claim for generalisation, inclusion of students from across 11 HEIs 
can arguably still guarantee sufficiently diverse institutional representation. Moreover, as Noy 
(2008, p. 327) emphasises, this sampling technique can facilitate discovery of the researched 
group’s ‘organic social networks and social dynamics’. For example, as I will demonstrate, this 
technique enabled me to approach a pocket of students who were active in the ‘Hong Kong 
Student Association of Beijing HEIs’, thus providing unanticipated and nuanced accounts 
about the advantages and struggles they experienced in organising activities for this 
Association. 
Participants were interviewed between one and three times. Interviews lasted between 45 
minutes and 120 minutes; all interviews were conducted online, via WeChat, either in 
Cantonese or Putonghua, depending on the preference of participants. All interviews were 
transcribed verbatim and analysed thematically using the qualitative data analysis software 
Atlas.ti. Only quotes that were used in this article were translated into English.  
Employing virtual interviews via WeChat allowed me to overcome time and financial 
constraints and transcend geographical and mobility boundaries in accessing research 
participants (Janghorban, Roudsari, & Taghipour, 2014). As a full-time faculty member at a 
European institution with limited budgets for international travels, conducting virtual 
interviews meant that I could fit interviews around participants’ busy schedules and my own 
work commitments. Admittedly, compared with face-to-face interviews, it was less 
straightforward for me to pick up social cues as conveyed through the immediate social 
ambience and participants’ body language. Nevertheless, the multiple rounds of interviews 
(especially with key participants) facilitated an extended interrogation of my participants’ 
situated social experiences. As a former mainland Chinese student who studied and worked in 
Hong Kong for nine years in the early 2000s, and as an academic who has researched identity 
issues of cross-border students for nearly a decade, I was able to sympathise with the 
 
8 
dilemmatic positions of my participants (to be elaborated) and establish rapport early in our 
interactions. My in-depth lived experiences in both mainland China and Hong Kong also 
provided ‘thick’ contextual understanding for interpreting the data.  
 
A second chance: Class and upward social mobility 
 
Academic advantages and career opportunities 
Unlike the middle-class students in Waters’ (2007, p. 486) study whose parents could send 
them abroad despite their ‘failure’ status in Hong Kong’s education, my participants were 
constrained by their limited economic capital. One third of participants considered going 
abroad but gave up the idea due to inadequate funding. For these students, the prospect of 
upward social mobility thus became a pertinent factor for choosing to study in the mainland. 
For instance, Norman (low-income family, father retired, mother as housewife) believed that 
Hong Kong’s class structure had been so rigid that it was impossible to achieve social mobility 
for students like him: 
 
I have a few good friends who have become unemployed as soon as they finished their 
post-compulsory education. It is hard to get a job…The first one studied for a top-up 
degree. Now he is unemployed. He tried to apply to be a police officer but failed. Now he 
works in McDonald’s and convenience stores. The second one went to Sydney to study, 
got an overseas qualification, but once he came back to Hong Kong he found out that it is 
very hard to get a decent job. Now he still works in Subway, and does the same routine 
work day in day out.  
As victims of Hong Kong’s highly unequal education system, these students’ effort to gain 
post-secondary education (i.e. sub-degrees) seemed to bring little return in their job searches. 
This is evident in the perceived inferior status of such qualifications among employers and by 
the society. These Hong Kong students (i.e. Norman’s friends) are arguably confined in the 
working-class strata due to the lack of symbolic recognition that their post-secondary education 
could accrue. Their plight evokes O’Sullivan and Tsang’s (2015, pp. 454-455) comment: 
‘Many young people in Hong Kong are now faced with diminished career prospects in a job 
market that offers little beyond soulless service jobs with stagnant wages’. Compared with 
Norman’s enrolment in one of China’s top universities, these friends of Norman’s also lacked 
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the opportunity to seek jobs in a much bigger labour market, thanks to the opportunity and 
associated advantages provided by the mainland universities: 
In Beijing I am at least a university student. Once I graduate, I can get a more dignified 
job (timian 体面): becoming a lawyer. This is a ladder that can allow me to achieve 
upward mobility and pursue my dreams, but in Hong Kong this is hard to achieve because 
there is much less room to develop. In the mainland, if I cannot get a job here [in Beijing], 
I can use my [degree] certificate to look for positions in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen-
-there ought to be a job for me, whereas in Hong Kong, can I get a job in Wanchai if I 
cannot get one in Mongkok? Hong Kong is simply too small and it is really hard to build 
my career there.  
Unlike in Hong Kong where law as a discipline traditionally excludes working-class students 
like Norman (Waters, 2007), in Beijing Norman gained a clear pathway to becoming a lawyer. 
The institutional prestige of this top university in Beijing also bestowed on him the legitimacy 
to seek jobs in the large labour markets of China. In comparison, the drastically smaller 
economy size of Hong Kong, as further compounded by ‘successive ways of recession’, 
‘business restructuring’ and ‘corporate down-sizing’, meant that fewer opportunities were 
available for the disadvantaged working-class youth (Ng & Ip, 2007, p. 68).  
Exceptional access to accruing social capital 
Upward social mobility was also achieved through exceptional access to a circle of top-level 
government officials and business elites from Hong Kong who would have otherwise been hard 
to reach for ordinary Hong Kong students of comparable academic calibre and socio-economic 
backgrounds to these participants. For instance, Catherine (low-income family, father retired, 
mother as housewife) revealed: 
 
The Office of the Government of Hong Kong in Beijing (BJO for short, zhujingban 驻京
办) takes good care of us…Every year there are different orientations, dinner receptions, 
gatherings etc—such opportunities to be connected with the government are not available 
to other students…it gives us opportunities to get in touch with many Chambers of 
Commerce, and can potentially allow us to get jobs in the future…e.g. My current job (at 
a Hong Kong university), I got to know my current boss when they came to my university 




The BJO had such official roles as facilitating exchanges and co-operation between Hong Kong 
and mainland China and providing practical assistance to Hong Kong citizens in mainland 
China. The BJO could be considered as a ‘diaspora institution’ (Kleist, 2008) which constantly 
creates occasions for Hong Kong citizens, such as the Hong Kong students and business elites 
based in Beijing, to socialise. Such opportunities are usually inaccessible to students studying 
in Hong Kong’s own universities. Thanks to this special ‘diasporic space’ in Beijing, such 
unique access can engender substantial benefits. Vivienne (low-income family, father had 
passed away, mother as security guard) recalled:  
 
I once joined an activity organised by the BJO and added the contact of a top-rank official 
from Hong Kong’s Immigration Office. I did not make any contact with him afterwards. 
However, in May this year I lost my ‘Mainland Travel Permit for Hong Kong Residents’ 
(huixiangzheng 回乡证), without realising it until one week before I was set to return to 
Hong Kong. At that time my air ticket could not be altered…It would normally take 2-3 
weeks to get a temporary travel permit, and there was just not enough time. Then I asked 
that high-rank official for help and he recommended some personnel in the Immigration 
Office to me, e.g. asking about how I could use the emergency channels and the kinds of 
documents required for such purposes. Eventually I could return to Hong Kong swiftly. 
 
In negotiating access to cross the within-country border, Vivienne’s ‘diaspora at home’ status 
and practices became foregrounded: as a Hong Kong citizen, Vivienne needed the ‘Mainland 
Travel Permit’ to return home. Losing this permit therefore posed as a crisis in her attempt to 
negotiate macro-political structures between the two entities. Had she not had access to this 
top-rank Hong Kong immigration official, she would have had to delay her return to Hong 
Kong and go through a more onerous process of organising the replacement permit. In this case, 
Vivienne’s ‘diaspora at home’ status firstly ameliorated her working-class status by offering 
her admission to the prestigious PKU, and further facilitated such exclusive social connections 
to the Immigration official, which subsequently became instrumental in her navigation to 
bypass the symbolic constraints posed by the border regime. There was a seeming full circle in 
which political implications of the ‘diaspora at home’ status became enmeshed with class. 
Indeed, Vivienne was acutely aware of the impossibility for her to gain competitive internships 




If you rely on yourself to apply for internships, the competition would be really keen…It 
is better if you rely on Guanxi, because he [a high-flying bank manager] is from Hong 
Kong, and you are a Hong Kong student, he would feel that we are all in an alien place 
and he would do what he can to help. 
 
Identifying as part of the Hong Kong diaspora in Beijing, ‘an alien place’, thus bound Vivienne 
together with this said bank manager, enabling her access to valuable social contacts. As Kleist 
(2008, p. 1130) suggests, ‘claims of diaspora can […] be seen as reflecting political aspirations 
and identifications, aiming to mobilise and link people to certain […] community’. Vivienne’s 
‘diasporic’ positioning in Beijing begot her the much-needed group connection and recognition, 
the Guanxi which facilitated her access to highly coveted internships. In this diasporic space in 
Beijing, the ‘diasporic’ belonging and identity thus made up for the ‘deficit’ of Vivienne’s class 
background.  
 
Political and politicised: Ramifications 
During the 2016 mainland Chinese higher education exhibition in Hong Kong, a Ministry of 
Education official made the following remark: 
The Ministry of Education actively improves policies, and works hard to create better 
study and living conditions for Hong Kong students, so as to convey the care and love of 
the central government to Hong Kong youth…our youth is the future of our country, the 
hope of our nation, it is mainland universities’ unshirkable responsibility to cultivate the 
reserve talents for the development of the country and the long-term prosperity and 
stability of Hong Kong. (my emphases) 
It can be argued that the admission of Hong Kong students by mainland universities was framed 
in this speech as a political means to ‘convey the central government’s care and love for Hong 
Kong youth’. Moreover, Hong Kong students recruited to mainland universities were 
constructed through their mission to sustaining the ‘the development of the country and the 
long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong’, i.e. their political values. Indeed, the PRC 
government’s preferential admission policies have been politically motivated, as underpinned 
by what Lan and Wu (2016, p. 757) argue: ‘a hidden agenda of nationalisation – seeking 
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political integration’. Such an inherently political nature of these Hong Kong students’ cross-
border education mobility had noticeable ramifications.  
 
Political tokens 
Firstly, as political subjects, the official and institutional special treatments rendered on them 
could attract public scrutiny among their mainland peers. For instance, while compulsory for 
mainland students, military training is exempted for students from Hong Kong. Honesty 
(middle class, parents as factory owners), who volunteered to join the military training, 
recounted how she was challenged: 
 
After the military training, I was interviewed and accorded the title of a ‘model soldier’ 
(biaobing 标兵). In fact, I was quite weak, so I was not sure how I got that title. Then I 
learned that it was because I voluntarily joined the military training. Some students began 
to ask why Hongkongers should have such privilege. I truly wanted to integrate, but 
instead other people conceived of me as abusing my privilege to gain public recognition. 
I felt a bit uncomfortable. 
As a politicised subject, Honesty’s voluntary participation in the military training created an 
opportunity for the institution to publicly reward her through the symbolic recognition of a 
‘model soldier’ title. This was, paralleling Lan and Wu’s (2016) comments on Taiwanese 
students’ experiences, motivated by a political intention of reinforcing national integration. 
However, from the perspective of mainland peers, such a ‘special’ treatment became a catalyst 
for scrutinising the ‘unfairness’ and the privilege that Honesty enjoyed. From Honesty’s 
perspective, her curiosity about military training did not necessitate her desire of becoming ‘a 
model soldier’. Instead, she intended it as her means to integrate with her mainland peers. 
However, the institutional act of mobilising her ‘diaspora at home’ status to achieving political 
ends resulted in imposing such a title, the legitimacy of which inadvertently became a subject 
of scrutiny. Honesty’s ‘diaspora at home’ status thus rendered her a ‘sacrifice’ in this seemingly 
benign political treatment. Her experiences were echoed by Christine (low-income family, 
father self-employed, mother as part-timer): 
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Many policies are not enforced on us, like joining class meetings or some general 
assemblies. They suggest that students from Hong Kong can choose whether to join. So, 
should I or should I not join? If I join, it seems I self-invite shamelessly. Sometimes I 
really don’t know what to do.  
Arguably, such preferential treatments placed these students in a state of ‘limbo’. Nancy 
(lower-middle class, father as businessman, mother as housewife) resonated, ‘Hong Kong 
[citizens in the mainland] are in an awkward position (gan’ga 尴尬), because we are Chinese 
citizens, but sometimes they would treat us differently, so I sometimes do not know how to 
position myself’. Such an ambivalent status, i.e. ‘neither citizen nor foreigner’, was paralleled 
in the experiences of Taiwanese students (Lan & Wu, 2016, p. 746) and induced friction and 
conflict. Some participants (e.g. Nancy) noted the political nature of their ‘diaspora at home’ 
status: 
In many mainland universities, usually the Propaganda Office would organise tours that 
attract Hongkonger students…They typically would get a banner and take some group 
photos…I don’t like such activities, because I don’t think I need to proclaim my 
Hongkonger identity this way.  
Nancy was sceptical of and actively resistant to the politically-driven display of their 
Hongkonger identity which was manipulated by university propaganda offices to convey 
political unity messages. As politicised subjects, Hong Kong students were often compelled to 
perform political functions, willingly or not. This resonates with Kleist’s (2008, p. 1130) 
argument that diaspora (in this case ‘diaspora at home’) ‘becomes a concept of a political 
identity nature that might at once be claimed by and attributed to different subjects and groups.’ 
These Hong Kong students might have unwittingly entered a quasi-political contract with the 
mainland universities to fulfil their political tokenistic roles in exchange of their preferential 
admissions and treatments. As ‘political tokens’, these Hong Kong students ‘seem to function 
as keys or signposts in a discourse of political justification’ (Shanafelt, 2005, p. 3).  
 
Potential political threats? 
A second ramification was related to the negative perceptions and receptions of these Hong 
Kong students’ assumed political orientations. As demonstrated in the Introduction, the rising 
tensions between mainland China and Hong Kong have bred right-wing nativism and high-
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profile protests. While the number of Hong Kong citizens in support of such events may not be 
substantial (Kurata, 2015), when such protests are communicated through the sensation-
capturing media in the mainland, negative impression can be easily forged among mainland 
university lecturers and students. For instance, Christine articulated: 
Just in the class next to mine, some mainland students said: ‘I don’t like Hong Kong, I 
dislike Hongkongers, you get out’ to the face of a Hong Kong student. I was in deep shock-
-it was just over the top. Another Hong Kong student from my university felt 
uncomfortable about some biased views expressed by a mainland lecturer in a class and 
ended up having an argument with that lecturer…Seeing such incidents, I started to 
wonder if I should tell people that I come from Hong Kong.  
It seems that the Hongkonger identity of these students became a marker that could easily 
trigger hostile confrontations on university campuses. This evokes what Kleist (2008: 1128) 
writes about the diaspora being used as a category to ‘claim a unified political stance’ of 
everybody who nominally belongs to the same group. In this case, the Hong Kong students 
were assumed to share a uniformed set of ‘problematic’ political beliefs. Catherine tried to 
challenge such impositions but was without success: 
If the lecturers verbally abused the Hongkongers in class, I would talk to them after 
class…after I spoke to one of them, he was in shock, realising that there were actually 
Hongkongers in his class…perhaps he would understand that not all Hongkongers think 
in the same way, politically, but this would not alter his bad impression of Hong Kong.  
                                                                                            
Mirroring what Kleist (2008, p. 1137) writes, the Hongkonger identity had, ‘rather than a 
putative collectivity, [been] mobilised as an established and absolute political actor with shared 
intentions’ in such situations, denying Catherine’s effort to highlight the internal diversity 
among Hongkongers. The ‘problematic’ nature of these Hong Kong students’ assumed political 
stance also engendered political surveillance. For instance, Catherine recalled: 
 
When we first started to organise this Hong Kong Student Association of Beijing Higher 
Education Institutions, it was quite sensitive. We initially did not elicit any support from 
the government, so there were a lot of constraints when we tried to organise any activity. 
The National Security Agency often checked on us, for fear that we would carry out 
political activities…One of the ways was to get support from the Chinese Liaison Office 
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in Hong Kong, to get lots of support from the government, and ensure that there was at 
least one government official attending every single activity that we organised. (my 
emphasis) 
  
Such intense political surveillance could be argued to stem from an established concern about 
the potentially ‘dangerous’ construction of diasporas in policy circles (Kleist, 2008, p. 1127). 
It is also in line with the Chinese government’s well-established ‘authoritarian political control’ 
over student organisations on university campuses (Yan, 2014, p. 493). Such experiences led 
to considerable emotional turmoil among these students, leading some of them to hide their 
Hongkonger identity. Frances (middle-class, parents as restaurant owners) and Nancy both 
confided trying multiple times to pretend that they were from Guangdong province, with an 
intention to be ‘closer to the other mainland students’. Christine, Shane (lower-middle class, 
father as engineer, mother as accountant) and Laura (middle-class, father as manager and 
mother as housewife) all concealed their Hongkonger identity by relying on their Putonghua 
proficiency.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article examines an understudied population in migration studies – cross-border students 
who are neither international nor domestic but have a unique ‘diaspora at home’ status. 
Through the ambiguous status of such students, the paper examines a central research question: 
what roles do class positions and political stances of Hong Kong students play in their 
experiences of mainland universities? Furthermore, this article illustrates both positive and 
negative roles the ‘diaspora at home’ status plays in these Hong Kong students’ educational 
and occupational navigation in mainland China. The paper sheds important light on rethinking 
the notions of border, citizenship, and nation-state in migration studies, and contributes to an 
expansive understanding of international students and cross-border education.  
More specifically, I have drawn on data to argue firstly that the experiences of these Hong 
Kong students have been deeply politicised due to their ‘diaspora at home’ status; and secondly, 
that their class positions in Hong Kong have uniquely oriented them to take up the opportunities 
offered by the politically-motivated preferential higher education admission policies of the 
PRC government, due to the prospect of upward social mobility which was much less 
accessible in Hong Kong.  
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In navigating their journeys in mainland China, these students’ ‘diaspora at home’ status 
interplayed with the special ‘diasporic space’ in Beijing and resulted in these students’ 
exclusive access to an elite circle of Hongkongers made up of top-rank government officials 
and business elites. Such social connections would not have been possible had they stayed in 
Hong Kong, and enabled these students to accumulate social capital that facilitated subsequent 
competitive internship and job opportunities. Getting admitted to prestigious mainland 
universities also provided these Hong Kong students much-needed institutional and 
professional prestige and channels to secure ‘dignified’ employments, either in mainland China 
or in Hong Kong.  
 
Meanwhile, the highly politicised nature of their ‘diaspora at home’ status has been 
characterised by their simultaneous roles as ‘political tokens’ for conveying political unity 
messages and as potentially ‘dangerous’ and ‘suspicious’ political others, subjecting them to 
intense public scrutiny, hostile political confrontations and surveillance on campus. While these 
Hong Kong students took advantage of the higher education and upward social mobility offered 
by the PRC government and institutions, they became unwittingly committed to serving as 
subjects (or indeed ‘tokens’) for fostering political integration. In these senses, the Hong Kong 
students could be considered as becoming ‘political sacrifices’ for the PRC government’s ‘state 
driven strategy…toward eventual political integration’ of ‘disarticulated political entities 
including Hong Kong’ (Lan and Wu, 2016, p. 745).   
 
Adopting ‘diaspora at home’ as an analytical lens has made it possible to tease out the nuances 
of the types of exclusions and navigations that these Hong Kong students as ‘strangers-within’ 
(Charusheela, 2007) have experienced, pertaining to politics and politicisation, and class and 
social mobility. As members of the ‘diaspora at home’, these Hong Kong students embodied 
and became impacted by many of the tensions and efforts that traditional diasporic groups have 
experienced when migrating abroad, e.g. exclusion and suspicion based on assumed and 
imposed political beliefs. Importantly, these Hong Kong students are dissimilar to their peers 
from middle-class backgrounds (Waters, 2007) and/or of higher academic achievement levels 
(Te and Postiglione, 2018); instead, their working-class background and/or academic standing 
inclined them towards such cross-border higher education moves. Distilling such embedded 
nature of class and politics thus allowed me to follow Brubaker’s (2005, p. 13) argument and 
focus on their ‘disaporic stances, projects, claims…practices’. Such an analytical orientation 
thus resonates with the consensus among migration scholars regarding the pertinence of 
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departing from methodological nationalism and becoming sensitive to internal heterogeneity 
of the diaspora groups (Anthias, 1998; Brubaker, 2005; Kleist, 2008).  
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